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Abstract —In this paper we propose a new method for the 
evaluation of network steganography algorithms based on the 
new concept of “the moving observer”.  We considered three 
levels of undetectability named: “good”, “bad”, and “ugly”. To 
illustrate this method we chose Wi-Fi steganography as a solid 
family of information hiding protocols. We present the state of 
the art in this area covering well-known hiding techniques for 
802.11 networks. “The moving observer” approach could help 
not only in the evaluation of steganographic algorithms, but also 
might be a starting point for a new detection system of network 
steganography. The concept of a new detection system, called 
MoveSteg, is explained in detail.  
 
Index Terms—Network steganography, information hiding, 
network security, Wi-Fi, 802.11, moving observer 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Coma” is a classic suspense film based on the novel 
of the same name by Robin Cook. When a female surgery 
resident notices an abnormal amount of comas relative to 
the number of patients, she uncovers a horrible 
conspiracy: the place of her professional activity is not a 
real hospital, but rather (we are sorry for disclosing the 
end of this movie) a farm for healthy and fresh organ 
donors. The synopsis of this film shows that sometimes 
things are not always what they seem. This is sad and 
true, but this is also a paradigm of information hiding, 
when somebody uses a carrier to fetch a hidden message 
(as a steganogram) to cheat an observer, who is unable to 
guess that covert communication exists. 
 We may imagine an almost infinite number of carriers 
[1] depending on technology awareness and the power of 
the observers. In this paper we are focusing on the 
network as a carrier, so we are taking into account the 
network steganography [2], which are information hiding 
techniques that utilize network protocols as enablers of 
covert communication. We will divide a range of network 
steganography algorithms into three categories (inspired 
by the Italian epic spaghetti western film directed by 
Sergio Leone) depending on the undetectability by the 
observer: “good”, “bad”, and “ugly” algorithms. We 
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assume a worst-case scenario for the sender (on the other 
hand it is the best for the observer): the observer is very 
close to the source of the steganograms. This assumption 
will allow recognition of the “good” and “bad” 
techniques. Later, we will consider when the observer has 
been moved away from the source, and some “bad” 
algorithms will be considered to be “ugly” ones. This is 
the basis of “the moving observer” technique that could 
help not only in the evaluation of steganographic 
algorithms, but also would be able to create fundamentals 
for a new detection system of network steganography 
called MoveSteg. The sender is observed from a distance 
by a group of sensors (observers), and some patterns of 
the traffic are evaluated from different perspectives to 
uncover any malicious behavior. 
We chose Wi-Fi steganography as a solid, but still not 
fully explored, family of information hiding methods; the 
next section presents the state of the art in this research 
area. In Section III we explain the concept of “the moving 
observer” and evaluate the algorithms presented in the 
previous section. In Section IV we present the concept of 
MoveSteg – a new detection system of network 
steganography based on “the moving observer”. Section 
V concludes this work and highlights future work. 
II. WI-FI STEGANOGRAPHY1: STATE OF THE ART 
A. Background 
The family of IEEE 802.11 standards is the most 
popular method of wireless Internet access and the way to 
organize Small Office Home Office (SOHO) networks. 
Due to the popularity of Wi-Fi networks and their 
advantages, such as easy configuration and significant 
bandwidth, they also bring some risks. One of them is the 
simplicity of radio channel eavesdropping. Since Wi-Fi 
networks belong to the family of shared medium 
networks, their members have the possibility of "hearing" 
all the data frames exchanged in the air within the 
transmission range. From the point of view of network 
steganography, such a feature of broadcast 
communication (one to all) is very attractive, as it can 
allow numerous scenarios for hidden communication. It 
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must be remembered, however, that for radio-based 
networks "the range is the limit". For Wi-Fi networks, 
typically the range is not larger than 100 meters (330 
feet) from a source station, and it must be noted that 
techniques developed for Wi-Fi steganography can also 
be useful for hidden communication in "long-distance" 
wireless networks, like Long Term Evolution (LTE) or 
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
(WiMax), which sounds very promising.  
Below we review the most well-known information 
hiding techniques for wireless networks, while classifying 
them according to the characteristic features they exploit. 
We also highlight existing efforts to implement these 
steganographic methods.  We divide this section as 
follows: 
• Methods based on intentionally corrupted 
checksums. 
• Methods using padding at physical layer. 
• Methods based on controlling intervals between 
OFDM symbols. 
• Other methods. 
• Implementations of steganographic techniques. 
B. Methods Based on Intentionally Corrupted 
Checksums 
The first steganographic system for Wi-Fi networks 
[4], according to our knowledge, was proposed by 
Szczypiorski and named HICCUPS (HIdden 
Communication system for CorrUPted networkS) [5]. For 
hidden transmission this method used frames with 
intentionally corrupted checksums. When a wireless 
client detected an error in a broadcast frame by checking 
the packet’s checksum, the client simply dropped the 
corrupted frame. In HICCUPS these rejected frames were 
used for hidden transmission. To detect HICCUPS, one 
needs to observe the number of frames with incorrect 
checksums. If the number of those frames is statistically 
anomalous, then a hidden communication can be 
suspected. Another way of detecting HICCUPS is based 
on comparing the dropped and retransmitted frames. 
Szczypiorski [6] showed that HICCUPS bandwidth was 
as high as 1.27 Mb/s for an IEEE 802.11g 54 Mb/s 
network with 10 stations, assuming that 5% of traffic is 
used for steganographic transmission. Hardware 
implementation of HICCUPS is rather difficult because 
frame control sums are calculated on the board of the 
network cards. It is possible (but not yet proven) to build 
a HICCUPS-enabled card on top of a field-programmable 
gate array (FPGA) card with the capabilities of a software 
defined radio [7]. Najafizadeh et al. [8] presented a 
simulation of HICCUPS based on the initial work of 
Odor et al. in [9]. 
C.  Methods Using Padding at Physical Layer 
The WiPad (Wireless Padding) [10] method was 
proposed by Szczypiorski and Mazurczyk for the 
802.11a/g standards. It exploited the fact that some Wi-Fi 
networks (especially the newest ones) use orthogonal 
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM).  To send data 
over the radio channel this technique uses several narrow-
bandwidth carriers of different frequencies. These carriers 
are more resilient to atmospheric conditions than a single 
wideband one, thus allowing for a more robust 
transmission. To minimize interference, OFDM divides 
the bits up into groups of pre-defined length, known as 
symbols, to assign them to the carriers. Most often the 
division of bits into symbols is not perfect: there will 
usually be some symbols left with too few bits. 
Therefore, there is so called "bit padding", i.e., OFDM 
transmitters adding extra throwaway bits, to make the 
symbols conform to the standard size. Since these bits are 
meaningless for the upper layers, they could be replaced 
with secret data.   The analysis of the IEEE 802.11 frame 
showed that two other fields are also liable to padding: 
SERVICE and TAIL. The lengths of SERVICE and 
TAIL are constant (16 and 6 bits, respectively), while a 
Physical layer Service Data Unit (PSDU) is a medium 
access control (MAC) frame and its length depends on 
user data, ciphers, and network operation mode (ad hoc 
vs. infrastructure). The padding is present in all frames, 
therefore some frames that are more frequently 
exchanged, like ACKs (acknowledgments) may become 
an interesting target for covert communication. The 
OFDM padding study [10] led to similar trials with the 
LTE [11] and WiMax [12] technologies, researched by 
Grabska et al.  
D. Methods Based on Controlling Intervals Between 
OFDM Symbols 
The work on WiPad was further continued and 
extended in [13] by Grabski and Szczypiorski. In this 
work the authors developed steganographic methods for 
high speed networks like 802.11n. They also exploited 
the fact that due to the multipath propagation present in 
radio transmission the receiver captures not only the 
signal propagated directly from the source, but also its 
delayed copies. As a consequence, the OFDM symbols 
can suffer from inter-symbol interferences. To mitigate 
this phenomenon a special safety interval can be inserted 
between OFDM symbols. Normally, in accordance with 
the IEEE 802.11 standards, these intervals are filled with 
the cyclic prefix. The system proposed by Grabski et al. 
was based on changing the prefixes of selected OFDM 
symbols and using them for hidden transmission. The 
steganographic bandwidth of such a covert channel 
ranged from 3.25 Mb/s to 19.5 Mb/s. A variation of this 
technique was implemented by Classen et al. [14]. 
E. Other Methods 
Other hiding techniques developed for Wi-Fi networks 
used CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 
Collision Avoidance) [15], controlling the rate of 
transmission [16], or a beacon mechanism [17].  
Holloway [15] proposed a method called Covert DCF - 
a timing channel based on the CSMA/CA mechanism 
used in 802.11 to avoid collisions. The main idea is based 
on controlling the random backoff – an internal 
mechanism for counting the time until the next 
transmission. The author achieved a steganographic 
bandwidth of around 2 kb/s.  Calhoun et al. [16] proposed 
a side channel that used the 802.11 MAC rate switching 
protocol to send hidden data between an access point and 
a station. The authors suggested two applications for this 
channel: covert authentication and covert Wi-Fi botnets. 
The covert authentication proposed by Calhoun et al. [16] 
was further developed by Sawicki and Piotrowski [17] to 
authenticate access points by using beacon frames and 
timestamp fields.  
F. Implementations of Steganographic Techniques 
Some of the steganographic channels were 
implemented in software [4][18][19]. Almost all of them 
were based on the modification of a header, which was 
the easiest way of controlling this part of the frame. 
Grabski and Szczypiorski [20] also proposed a tool for 
steganalysis.  To our knowledge, only two publications 
have described hardware implementations, namely [7] 
and [14]. 
Kraetzer et al. [4] proposed two steganographic 
methods based on packet duplication/modification. The 
first method was based on header modification, especially 
on the "Retry" and "More Data" bits and on the 
"Duration/ID" field. The second technique exploited time 
dependencies between frames, and the authors revised 
their work in [21].  Frikha et al. [18] created a 
steganographic system based on header modification at 
the MAC sublayer. The authors proposed to use 
independently two fields of a MAC header: Sequence 
Control (SC) and Initial Vector (IV) for WEP (Wired 
Equivalent Privacy) protected frames. It is worth noting 
that WEP encryption is currently not commonly used as it 
is deemed insecure. Goncalves et al. [19] extended the 
work of Frikha et al. and proposed to use two bits in the 
protocol version field of the Frame Control Field in a 
MAC header to carry hidden information. Finally, 
Grabski et al. [20] implemented a Wi-Fi steganalyser as a 
tool to passively monitor the network traffic to detect 
hidden communication. The system was able to recognize 
five scenarios based on [4] and [18], including those 
based on the "Duration/ID" field as well as "Retry" and 
"More Data". 
Dutta et al. [7] proposed a covert channel based on 
encoding covert information in the physical layer of 
common wireless communication protocols (called Dirty 
Constellation) and demonstrated the technique by 
implementing it in a software-defined radio for 
802.11a/g. 
Classen et al. [14] implemented four different covert 
channels:  
• Using the Short Training Field in combination 
with Phase Shift Keying (PSK). 
• Using the Carrier Frequency Offset with 
Frequency Shift Keying (FSK). 
• Using 802.11a/g with additional subcarriers 
conforming to the 802.11n spectrum mask (an 
extension of [7]). 
• Replacing parts of the OFDM Cyclic Prefix (an 
extension of [13]). 
III. “THE MOVING OBSERVER” TECHNIQUE - EVALUATION 
OF THE ALGORITHMS 
According to [22], network steganography 
communication can be characterized by four features: 
bandwidth, undetectability, robustness, and cost. The first 
three features, introduced by Fridrich in 1998 [23], are 
often presented as vertices of a triangle to show the 
interdependence among them. For example, the higher 
the required bandwidth, the more difficult it is to achieve 
high undetectability and robustness. This interdependence 
causes the need for a trade-off between the three features 
when a new steganographic system is designed. The last 
feature mentioned – cost – indicates the degradation of 
the carrier caused by the insertion of the secret data 
procedure [24]. It is important to note that the cost 
depends on each particular carrier, and it could be 
expressed in many ways, e.g. increased delay of packets, 
increased bit error rate, etc. It should be emphasized that 
the most desirable characteristic of network 
steganography communication is usually undetectability 
[25]. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The moving observer (Ob) is located close to the steganogram 
sender (SS). 
“The moving observer” technique allows the 
evaluation of the strength of steganographic algorithms 
related to the undetectability. We considered three levels 
of undetectability named: “good”, “bad”, and “ugly” 
defined as follows: 
• “Good” – the observer is unable to detect a 
hidden communication at the source of the 
steganograms (SS) – Fig. 1. 
• “Bad” – the observer is able to detect a hidden 
communication at the source of the steganograms 
(SS), but he/she is unable to detect this 
communication, when he/she is moved away from 
the SS  – Fig. 1. 
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• “Ugly” – the observer is able to detect a hidden 
communication anywhere in the network, even at 
the steganographic receiver (SR) – Fig. 2. 
Always the proximity of the observer to the SS gives a 
chance to learn exactly the relations among the packets 
and their structure. Moving far away from the source 
involves phenomenon in the network like noise, which is 
introduced by the physical channel, but also by each 
switching hop adding some distortions on the inter-arrival 
time, size, or order of the packets. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The moving observer (Ob) is located close to the steganogram 
receiver (SR). 
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 present an abstract view of the 
network topology. This view is discrete rather than 
continuous – numbered circles (1-4) are similar to the 
orbits that could be equivalent to the hops (in logical 
order) or even geographical distances (in physical order, 
especially for Wi-Fi networks). 
TABLE I: EVALUATION OF WI-FI STEGANOGRAPHY 
Author(s) Mark 
and acronym (if exists) Good Bad Ugly 
Calhoun et al. [1]   ✓ 
Classen et al. [14]   ✓ 
Dutta et al. [7]  ✓  
Frikha et al. [18]   ✓ 
Goncalves et al. [19]   ✓ 
Grabski et al. [13]   ✓ 
Holloway [15] ✓   
Kraetzer et al. [4] – first method   ✓ 
Kraetzer et al. [4] – second method ✓   
Sawicki et al. [17]   ✓ 
Szczypiorski [5], HICCUPS  ✓  
Szczypiorski et al. [10], WiPad   ✓ 
Total marks 2 2 8 
 
In a worst-case scenario for the sender (and the best for 
the observer): the observer is very close to the SS (Fig. 
1), but typically he/she is somewhere in the network, so a 
best-case scenario for the sender (and worst for the 
observer) is to be very close to the SR (Fig. 2). We 
evaluated the proposals presented in the previous section 
according to the definitions of “good”, “bad”, and “ugly”. 
Some of these proposals included several algorithms 
([14] has four), but we distinguish specific algorithms 
only when it was necessary ([4] – first and a second 
methods). According to Table I, two proposals are 
marked as “good” ([15] and [4] – second method), two as 
“bad” ([5][7]), and eight as “ugly” ([1][10][13][14] 
[17][18][19] and [4] – first method). “Ugly” methods are 
relatively naïve and could always be detected. “Bad” ones 
are only sophisticated for some distance from the source: 
both [5] and [7] could be recognized as a transmissions in 
a very noisy channel. The methods presented in [15] and 
[4] (second method) are “good” ones – both of these 
methods change the logical understanding of the Wi-Fi 
networks – [15] at the CSMA/CA level and [4] the 
interpretation of frame relations. 
IV. MOVESTEG: NEW DETECTION SYSTEM OF NETWORK 
STEGANOGRAPHY 
“The moving observer” technique is a basis that can 
help not only in the evaluation of steganographic 
algorithms, but it also would be able to create the 
fundamentals for a novel network steganographic 
detection system called MoveSteg. The main target of the 
system is to detect “bad” methods. “Good” ones are 
strong enough to be detected even at the SS, so they are 
out of MoveSteg’s scope. Detection of “ugly” methods 
can be made anywhere with sensors (observing nodes), as 
presented by Grabski et al. [20], and we assumed that the 
observer can break all these algorithms. Most interesting 
is cracking “the bad” methods, especially by moving 
from as close as possible to the SR to the SS or by 
observing SS from several perspectives (the minimum is 
two). Figures 3, 4, and 5 illustrate three scenarios: 
• Two observing nodes (N1 and N2) are located close 
to SR, but none of these nodes are close to SS. 
• Two observing nodes (N1’ and N2’) are located close 
to SR’, one of them (N2’) is close to SS. 
• An observing node N1” is located close to SR”. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Two observing nodes (N1 and N2) are located close to SR. 
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Fig. 3 shows that a hypothetical value V can be 
measured and compared from two nodes. For example, V 
could be a growth in delay – if it is almost 0, but a huge 
delay still exists from SS that could be an indicator of a 
delay based on steganography.  In Fig. 4, V is called  V’. 
Fig. 6 presents the superposition of observing nodes 
and steganogram receivers that could be a way of 
cooperation to detect network steganography. Therefore, 
the values of V, V’, and V’’ are used together. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Two observing nodes (N1’ and N2’) are located close to SR’; N2’ 
is also close to SS. 
 
 
Fig. 5. An observing node N1” is located close to SR”. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Superposition of observing nodes and steganogram receivers.  
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The main aim of network steganography designers is 
to propose stealth methods linked to a minimized 
detectability. We introduced a categorization of such 
methods. “The good” methods are perfectly applicable 
and hardly detectable anywhere in a network, “the bad” 
ones are acceptable from some distance as they are 
detectable at the source of the steganograms, but “the 
ugly” ones are naïve and should be avoided. 
In this paper we outlined the concept of MoveSteg 
applied to Wi-Fi networks, but it could be used with any 
type of the network. Future work will focus on the 
implementation of MoveSteg and is currently in progress. 
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